

**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2647, AS REPORTED**  
**OFFERED BY MR. KING OF IOWA**

At the end of subtitle B of title XII of the bill, add the following new section:

1 **SEC. 12xx. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND STATEMENT OF POL-**  
2 **ICY ON THE "SURGE STRATEGY" IN IRAQ.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

4 (1) On October 16, 2002, President George W.  
5 Bush signed into law H. J. Res. 114, the Authoriza-  
6 tion for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolu-  
7 tion of 2002 (Public Law 107–243), authorizing the  
8 President to use military force to “defend the na-  
9 tional security of the United States against the con-  
10 tinuing threat posed by Iraq” and “to enforce all  
11 relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions  
12 against Iraq”.

13 (2) On March 17, 2003, President Bush gave  
14 Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, an  
15 ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid  
16 war.

17 (3) In providing the rationale for this ulti-  
18 matum, President Bush pointed to the following:

1 (A) The universal consensus of intelligence  
2 gathered by the United States and other gov-  
3 ernments which concluded Iraq continued to de-  
4 velop, possess, and conceal weapons of mass de-  
5 struction and the means to deliver them.

6 (B) The threat posed to the United States  
7 and other countries by the growing threat of  
8 chemical, biological or nuclear terrorist attacks  
9 launched by or in collusion with the Hussein re-  
10 gime.

11 (C) The failure of peaceful efforts to dis-  
12 arm the Iraqi regime.

13 (D) The unanimously approved United Na-  
14 tions Security Council Resolution 1441, which  
15 found that Iraq "has been and remains in ma-  
16 terial breach of its obligations under relevant  
17 resolutions, including resolution 687, in par-  
18 ticular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with  
19 United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and  
20 to complete the [disarmament] actions required  
21 under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687".

22 (E) The Hussein regime's use of weapons  
23 of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors  
24 and against Iraq's people.

1           (F) The regime's history of reckless ag-  
2           gression in the Middle East.

3           (G) The aid, training, and harbor the re-  
4           gime had given to terrorists, including  
5           operatives of Al Qaeda.

6           (H) The overwhelming vote of the United  
7           States Congress on October 11, 2002, to sup-  
8           port the use of force in Iraq.

9           (I) The need to disarm Saddam Hussein in  
10          order to diminish the terrorist and security  
11          threat to the United States and the world.

12          (J) The United States' sovereign authority  
13          to use force in assuring its own national secu-  
14          rity.

15          (4) On March 19, 2003, after Saddam Hussein  
16          and his sons refused to leave Iraq, the United States  
17          led an international coalition military force in  
18          launching Operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm and  
19          topple the Hussein regime, bring freedom to the peo-  
20          ple of Iraq, and establish a democratic government  
21          in Iraq capable of defending and sustaining itself  
22          and acting as an ally in the War on Terror.

23          (5) The Hussein regime was toppled on or  
24          about April 9, 2003.

1           (6) A Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)  
2           was subsequently established in Iraq to provide gov-  
3           ernance and to facilitate the transition of Iraq into  
4           a democracy capable of providing its own internal  
5           security, sustaining itself, and acting as an ally in  
6           the War on Terror.

7           (7) From March 19, 2003, to the present time,  
8           the United States and Coalition Forces from 39  
9           countries have engaged many enemies on the battle-  
10          fields of Iraq, including—

11                 (A) the “Fedayeen Saddam” and other mi-  
12                 litias loyal to Saddam and the Baathist resist-  
13                 ance;

14                 (B) various localized Sunni militias pro-  
15                 viding protection to certain Sunni neighbor-  
16                 hoods and population groups;

17                 (C) terrorist organizations, including Al  
18                 Qaeda in Iraq;

19                 (D) Shiite militias, including Moqtada Al  
20                 Sadr’s Mahdi Army;

21                 (E) Shiite vigilante groups acting much  
22                 like their Sunni counterparts;

23                 (F) Iranian-supported Shiite groups, in-  
24                 cluding the Supreme Council for Islamic Revo-  
25                 lution in Iraq’s Badr Corps; and

1           (G) members of, as well as forces trained  
2           and supplied by, the Qods Force of Iran's Revo-  
3           lutionary Guard and other Iranian agents.

4           (8) On December 28, 2004, Al Qaeda released  
5           an audio message from Osama Bin Laden in which  
6           he stated, "The most important and serious issue  
7           today for the world is this Third World War. . . .  
8           It is raging in the land of the two rivers [Iraq]. The  
9           world's millstone and pillar is in Baghdad, the cap-  
10          ital of the caliphate." He said "the whole world is  
11          watching this war," and it will end in "victory and  
12          glory or misery and humiliation."

13          (9) By December 2006, the security situation in  
14          Iraq had severely deteriorated largely as the result  
15          of increased Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence sparked  
16          by the February 22, 2006, bombing by Al Qaeda in  
17          Iraq of the Askariya Shitte mosque in Samarra and  
18          fueled by the many violent acts that followed which  
19          were perpetrated by Al Qaeda in Iraq and the var-  
20          ious other sectarian and political enemy groups com-  
21          peting for power and attempting to defeat United  
22          States and coalition forces in Iraq.

23          (10) In their report, The Way Forward--A New  
24          Approach, the members of the Iraq Study Group  
25          stated they could "support a short-term redeploy-

1       ment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize  
2       Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping  
3       mission, if the United States commander in Iraq de-  
4       termines that such steps would be effective”.

5           (11) As a result of the deteriorating security  
6       situation in Iraq, President Bush announced “A  
7       New Way Forward,” on January 10, 2007, which  
8       called for a surge of 28,500 United States troops  
9       into Iraq to execute new counter insurgency strate-  
10      gies, as outlined in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency,  
11      under the command of that document’s principal au-  
12      thor, General David Petraeus.

13          (12) President Bush showed great leadership,  
14      judgment, and fortitude as commander in chief in  
15      ordering the adoption of the “surge strategy,” de-  
16      spite being counseled by some of his top military ad-  
17      visors not to pursue the troop build up.

18          (13) The goal of the “surge strategy” was to  
19      increase the size of the United States military force  
20      on the ground in Iraq to secure the Iraqi population  
21      by killing or capturing the terrorists and militia who  
22      had unleashed the destructive wave of violence in  
23      Iraq since 2006, and to move United States forces  
24      into Iraqi neighborhoods to partner with Iraqi civil-  
25      ians and security forces in clearing those neighbor-

1 hoods of enemy forces and maintaining security con-  
2 trol to hold those areas once cleared.

3 (14) President Bush and General Petraeus,  
4 among others, believed that by increasing the size of  
5 United States forces in Iraq and following the  
6 counter-insurgency tactics developed in FM 3-24  
7 Counterinsurgency, United States and Coalition  
8 forces, working with Iraqi Security Forces, could  
9 bring safety and security to the Iraqi people, provide  
10 the time necessary to train and equip Iraqi Security  
11 Forces, of which there are now more than 613,000,  
12 and provide the Iraqi Government with the stable se-  
13 curity environment needed to bring about the rec-  
14 onciliation necessary to establish that government's  
15 relevance and authority throughout the country.

16 (15) One of the first signs of the success of the  
17 "surge strategy" was the development of the Sunni  
18 "Awakening," in which Sunni tribal leaders in  
19 Anbar Province responded to, and allied themselves  
20 with, United States military and Coalition forces in  
21 turning against Al Qaeda in Iraq.

22 (16) Some of the most dangerous streets in the  
23 world have become peaceful centers of commerce.

24 (17) Anbar Province, where Marines have been  
25 stationed throughout much of the war and which

1 was once one of the most dangerous parts of Iraq,  
2 has been pacified to the point at which on January  
3 23, 2009, General James Conway, the Commandant  
4 of the United States Marine Corps, explained that  
5 the combat portion of the Iraq war is effectively  
6 over, stating "The time is right for Marines in gen-  
7 eral terms to leave Iraq."

8 (18) The mayor of Fallujah has declared the  
9 city to be a "city of peace".

10 (19) Since implementing the President's "surge  
11 strategy" in Iraq, civilian deaths have dropped by  
12 more than 90 percent since December 2006, to levels  
13 not seen since 2004.

14 (20) President Bush's adoption of the "surge  
15 strategy" has made Iraq a safer place for United  
16 States troops.

17 (21) Since July 1, 2008, the number of United  
18 States troops in Iraq who have been killed in acci-  
19 dents is approximately equal to the number of  
20 United States troops in Iraq who have been killed by  
21 the enemy.

22 (22) The surge strategy has delivered a signifi-  
23 cant defeat to the terrorist and militia organizations  
24 that once controlled vast areas of Iraq and were re-

1       sponsible for the formerly high levels of violence in  
2       Iraq.

3       (23) On May 25, 2008, Ryan Crocker, the  
4       United States Ambassador to Iraq, stated that Al  
5       Qaeda in Iraq "has never been closer to defeat" and  
6       on July 25, 2008, said that the Sunni insurgency,  
7       writ large, is "not much of a challenge any more"  
8       to Iraq's future.

9       (24) Ethno-sectarian violence has diminished  
10      significantly, falling 98 percent from its highest  
11      monthly death toll of 2,086, recorded for December  
12      of 2006.

13      (25) The security of the International Zone in  
14      Baghdad (the Green Zone) was transferred to the  
15      Iraqi Security Forces on January 1, 2009.

16      (26) 13 of Iraq's 18 provinces are now entirely  
17      the responsibility and under the control of Iraqi Se-  
18      curity Forces.

19      (27) The self-evident fact that al Qaeda in Iraq  
20      has been defeated as a military force, a fact that has  
21      become clear over the past year, beginning with  
22      statements made by Abu-Tariq, a local Al Qaeda  
23      leader near Balad, is demonstrated in a letter cap-  
24      tured by United States forces in early 2008, in  
25      which Abu-Tariq wrote that as a result of the Sunni

1       Awakening that followed the implementation of the  
2       “surge strategy,” “The Americans and the apos-  
3       tates launched their campaigns against us and we  
4       found ourselves in a circle not being able to move,  
5       organize or conduct our operations. . . . This created  
6       weakness and psychological defeat. This also created  
7       panic, fear and the unwillingness to fight. The mo-  
8       rale of the fighters went down. . . . There was a  
9       total collapse in the security structure of the organi-  
10      zation.”

11           (28) Whereas 17 of the 18 benchmarks, estab-  
12      lished by Congress and signed into law on May 25,  
13      2007, by President Bush as part of H.R. 2206, the  
14      U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Re-  
15      covery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act,  
16      2007 (Public Law 110–28), to provide for an objec-  
17      tive analysis of progress toward reconciliation and  
18      self-governance by the Iraqi Government have been  
19      substantially or completely met since the “surge  
20      strategy” was adopted.

21           (29) One of the most important benchmarks  
22      was recently met when new provincial elections were  
23      held successfully in Iraq on January 31, 2009.

24           (30) The final unmet benchmark, increasing  
25      Iraqi Security Force units’ capability of operating

1 independently, requires a continued United States  
2 presence to ensure full attainment in the future.

3 (31) On February 4, 2009, Ambassador Ryan  
4 Crocker stressed the importance of a continued  
5 United States presence in Iraq when he said “Iraq’s  
6 development will be a long-term project, requiring  
7 the long-term strategic commitment of the United  
8 States”.

9 (32) There have been two legitimate, nation-  
10 wide elections in Iraq on January 30, 2005, and on  
11 December 15, 2005.

12 (33) The Iraqis, on October 15, 2005, by pop-  
13 ular vote, ratified their constitution, which estab-  
14 lishes the Rule of Law in Iraq.

15 (34) The “surge strategy” has ushered in a  
16 level of safety and security in Iraq such that the  
17 United States and the Government of Iraq were able  
18 to sign a Status of Forces Agreement on November  
19 17, 2008, and which took effect on January 1, 2009,  
20 that continues the transfer of security responsibil-  
21 ities within Iraq to Iraqi forces and provides for the  
22 withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq in 36  
23 months by the end of 2011.

24 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
25 gress that the “surge strategy” articulated by President

1 George W. Bush as part of “A New Way Forward” has  
2 succeeded in providing security and stability to the Iraqi  
3 people, addressing the threat posed to the Government of  
4 Iraq and the continued existence of a unified and inde-  
5 pendent country of Iraq by terrorist organizations and sec-  
6 tarian militias, and facilitating the opportunity for the  
7 Government of Iraq to make the decisions necessary for  
8 national reconciliation and governance to occur.

9 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Congress—

10 (1) recognizes the enormous sacrifices made by  
11 the men and women of the United States and Coali-  
12 tion forces from 39 countries to secure the successes  
13 gained in Iraq and thanks these heroes for their  
14 courage, nobility, and sacrifice to defend freedom  
15 and defeat our enemies;

16 (2) extends its gratitude to all those within the  
17 military and civilian departments and agencies of  
18 the United States Government responsible for direct-  
19 ing the implementation of the “surge strategy,” in-  
20 cluding General David Petraeus and Ambassador  
21 Ryan Crocker;

22 (3) recognizes the importance and significance  
23 of victory in the Iraqi theater of the larger, global  
24 struggle against radical, Islamic Jihadist terrorists;  
25 and

1           (4) commits itself to working with President  
2       Barack Obama and his administration to continue  
3       the progress that has been made on the ground in  
4       Iraq since the “surge strategy” was implemented,  
5       recognizing that a definable victory has been  
6       achieved in Iraq and that history will judge Presi-  
7       dent Bush’s successor by his ability to maintain his  
8       predecessor’s victory.

