

**AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1401, AS REPORTED  
OFFERED BY MR. CASTLE OF DELAWARE,  
MR. BISHOP OF GEORGIA, OR MR.  
ROEMER OF INDIANA**

At the end of title X (page 305, after line 5), insert  
the following new section:

**1 SEC. 1040. REPORT ON SPACE LAUNCH FAILURES.**

2 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense  
3 shall submit to the President and the specified congres-  
4 sional committees a report on the factors involved in the  
5 three recent failures of the Titan IV space launch vehicle  
6 and the systemic and management reforms that the Sec-  
7 retary is implementing to minimize future failures of that  
8 vehicle and future launch systems. The report shall be  
9 submitted not later than February 15, 2000. The Sec-  
10 retary shall include in the report all information from the  
11 reviews of those failures conducted by the Secretary of the  
12 Air Force and launch contractors.

13 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall  
14 include the following information:

15 (1) An explanation for the failure of a Titan  
16 IVA launch vehicle on August 12, 1998, the failure  
17 of a Titan IVB launch vehicle on April 9, 1999, and  
18 the failure of a Titan IVB launch vehicle on April

1 30, 1999, as well as any information from civilian  
2 launches which may provide information on systemic  
3 problems in current Department of Defense launch  
4 systems, including, in addition to a detailed technical  
5 explanation and summary of financial costs for each  
6 such failure, a one-page summary for each such fail-  
7 ure indicating any commonality between that failure  
8 and other military or civilian launch failures.

9 (2) A review of management and engineering  
10 responsibility for the Titan, Inertial Upper Stage,  
11 and Centaur systems, with an explanation of the re-  
12 spective roles of the Government and the private sec-  
13 tor in ensuring mission success and identification of  
14 the responsible party (Government or private sector)  
15 for each major stage in production and launch of the  
16 vehicles.

17 (3) A list of all contractors and subcontractors  
18 for each of the Titan, Inertial Upper Stage, and  
19 Centaur systems and their responsibilities and five-  
20 year records for meeting program requirements.

21 (4) A comparison of the practices of the De-  
22 partment of Defense, the National Aeronautics and  
23 Space Administration, and the commercial launch  
24 industry regarding the management and oversight of

1 the procurement and launch of expendable launch  
2 vehicles.

3 (5) An assessment of whether consolidation in  
4 the aerospace industry has affected mission success,  
5 including whether cost-saving efforts are having an  
6 effect on quality and whether experienced workers  
7 are being replaced by less experienced workers for  
8 cost-saving purposes.

9 (6) Recommendations on how Government con-  
10 tracts with launch service companies could be im-  
11 proved to protect the taxpayer, together with the  
12 Secretary's assessment of whether the withholding of  
13 award and incentive fees is a sufficient incentive to  
14 hold contractors to the highest possible quality  
15 standards and the Secretary's overall evaluation of  
16 the award fee system.

17 (7) A short summary of what went wrong tech-  
18 nically and managerially in each launch failure and  
19 what specific steps are being taken by the Depart-  
20 ment of Defense and space launch contractors to en-  
21 sure that those errors do not reoccur.

22 (8) An assessment of the role of the Depart-  
23 ment of Defense in the management and technical  
24 oversight of the launches that failed and whether the

1 Department of Defense, in that role, contributed to  
2 the failures.

3 (9) An assessment of the effect of the launch  
4 failures on the schedule for Titan launches, on the  
5 schedule for development and first launch of the  
6 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, and on the  
7 ability of industry to meet Department of Defense  
8 requirements.

9 (10) An assessment of the impact of the launch  
10 failures on assured access to space by the United  
11 States, and a consideration of means by which ac-  
12 cess to space by the United States can be better as-  
13 sured.

14 (11) An assessment of any systemic problems  
15 that may exist at the eastern launch range, whether  
16 these problems contributed to the launch failures,  
17 and what means would be most effective in address-  
18 ing these problems.

19 (12) An assessment of the potential benefits  
20 and detriments of launch insurance and the impact  
21 of such insurance on the estimated net cost of space  
22 launches.

23 (13) A review of the responsibilities of the De-  
24 partment of Defense and industry representatives in  
25 the launch process, an examination of the incentives

1 of the Department and industry representatives  
2 throughout the launch process, and an assessment of  
3 whether the incentives are appropriate to maximize  
4 the probability that launches will be timely and suc-  
5 cessful.

6 (14) Any other observations and recommenda-  
7 tions that the Secretary considers relevant.

8 (c) INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than December 15,  
9 1999, the Secretary shall submit to the specified congres-  
10 sional committees an interim report on the progress in the  
11 preparation of the report required by this section, includ-  
12 ing progress with respect to each of the matters required  
13 to be included in the report under subsection (b).

14 (d) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—For  
15 purposes of this section, the term “specified congressional  
16 committees” means the following:

17 (1) The Committee on Armed Services, the Se-  
18 lect Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee  
19 on Appropriations of the Senate.

20 (2) The Committee on Armed Services, the Per-  
21 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the  
22 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-  
23 resentatives.